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Abstract—Fraud review detection is a hot research topic in
recent years. The Cold-start is a particularly new but significant
problem referring to the failure of a detection system to recognize
the authenticity of a new user. State-of-the-art solutions employ
a translational knowledge graph embedding approach (TransE)
to model the interaction of the components of a review system.
However, these approaches suffer from the limitation of TransE
in handling N-1 relations and the narrow scope of a single
classification task, i.e., detecting fraudsters only. In this paper,
we model a review system as a Heterogeneous Information
Network (HIN) which enables a unique representation to every
component and performs graph inductive learning on the review
data through aggregating features of nearby nodes. HIN with
graph induction helps to address the camouflage issue (fraudsters
with genuine reviews) which has shown to be more severe
when it is coupled with cold-start, i.e., new fraudsters with
genuine first reviews. In this research, instead of focusing only
on one component, detecting either fraud reviews or fraud
users (fraudsters), vector representations are learnt for each
component, enabling multi-component classification. In other
words, we are able to detect fraud reviews, fraudsters, and fraud-
targeted items, thus the name of our approach DFraud3. DFraud3
demonstrates a significant accuracy increase of 13% over the
state of the art on Yelp.
Index Terms—Social Media, Fraud, cold-start, Inductive
Learning, Multi-Component Classification, Camouflage.
I. INTRODUCTION
Reading through online reviews before making a purchase
is increasingly a common practice of consumers. Studies [1]
show that a rating increase of 1-star in Yelp may lead to a
5-9% in a surge of increase for a restaurant. The financial
implications of online reviews are becoming significant which
incentivise some businesses to pay imposters to write fake
comments, i.e. fraud reviews, to either promote one’s own
business or defame competitors. Experts estimate that between
9% to 40% of reviews in Amazon are fraud [1].
Given the challenging nature of fraud review detection, even
humans can only achieve an accuracy close to a random guess.
It is, therefore, not surprising to see a surge of research effort
in this area. To ensure a clear discussion of the research done
in this area, let us model a review platform as a triple 〈review,
user, item〉 where a review is written by a user for an item.
Fraud detection algorithms typically rely on historical data
to extract behavioral patterns of users, which have shown to
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be more effective than linguistic features [2], [3] for fraud
review detection. A key problem resulting from the reliance
on historical data in such fraud detection systems is the
phenomenon of cold-start. Cold-start refers to the failure of a
detection system to recognize the authenticity of a new user
u given the first review r on an item i, since there is no
historical information about that user. Furthermore, detecting
fraud reviews and fraudsters may take time, and even when
they are detected, the fraud reviews have already had their
negative impacts. The situation is exacerbated when new
fraudsters apply the camouflage strategy in their first reviews.
Camouflage [2], [3], [4], [5] refers to the act of writing
genuine reviews by fraudsters to hide their true identity and
mask their traces. As a result of this act a fraudster gains
the trust of other people before writing his/her first fraud
review. Surprisingly, most fraudsters start their activity with
genuine reviews, in order to cover up their true identity. In fact,
statistics on the widely used Yelp dataset show that 62.18%
of fraudsters (1319 users out of 2121 camouflaged users)
started their activity by writing genuine reviews. Intuitively,
information from other components can be used to predict the
probability of camouflage behaviors. For example, a review
from a new user for an item frequently targeted by fraudsters
is more likely to be a fraud [2]. Hence, multi-component
classification to classify reviews into genuine or not, users into
fraudsters or not, and items into targeted or not, plays a very
important role in handling cold-start, even when camouflage
is employed by new fraudsters.
Recent attempts at the cold-start problem [6], [7] adopted
a knowledge graph embedding approach to model the relation
between three components, namely, review, user, and item. To
learn their respective vector representations, Wang et al. [6]
and You et al. [7] adopted the TransE [8] embedding model,
attempting to jointly learn the salient features representing
each of the three components. However, despite TransE’s
simplicity and effectiveness in capturing multiple relations, its
well known limitation is that it only works for 1-to-1 but not 1-
to-N nor N-to-1 relations [9]. This is a significant drawback for
the fraud review detection domain, because it is quite common
for the same user to write similar reviews to different services.
Take the Yelp dataset for instance, 5.56% of users (5,034
out of 90,177) wrote similar reviews (reviews like “Yummy”)
for different items. In TransE parlance, for these users, one
review (same content) is translated through one or more users
to describe multiple items, thus exhibiting a N-1 relationship.
In addition, 6.62% of items (334 out of 5,044) have similar
reviews (e.g., “Great Steaks” or “Awesome”) from different
users, reflecting the 1-N-1 relation (same review, different
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2users, same item) as illustrated in Fig 1. This limitation
causes multiple users modelled as relations in TransE to have
identical vector representations, as was also observed by [10].
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Fig. 1: TransE limitation in handling 1-N-1 relations, resulting
in the same vector representations for both honest and fraud-
ster user, which renders the user embeddings ineffective in
differentiating fraudsters from genuine users.
Accordingly, modeling users as a separate component is
fundamental in obtaining a useful representation for each
user, which TransE fails to achieve. Moreover, the camouflage
problem is neglected, despite that it may significantly affect the
performance of fraud review detection systems when coupled
with cold-start. This calls for a better representation learning
model with the ability to represent the intrinsic multi-relations
between components, and to help spot the fraudsters when
they start writing either fraud reviews from the beginning or
genuine reviews to camouflage themselves.
Heterogeneous Information Networks (HIN) have been
demonstrated to be suitable when it comes to gathering infor-
mation from interconnected components [3]. In this research,
to address the limitations of TransE, we choose to use an HIN
as a more natural model for social review platform representa-
tion. Contrary to the random vector strategy for network com-
ponent initialization, in this research, we argue the importance
of an appropriate component vector representation. Based on
the theory of Collective Intelligence [11], [12], aggregations
of reviews are used to characterise each component in the
network. In other words, a review’s vector representation is the
Sum of Word Embedding (SoWE) of all tokens in the review;
a user’s vector representation is then the SoWE of all reviews
written by this user; and an item is the SoWE of all reviews
about this item. The SoWE are further fine-tuned by training
three independent Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs).
CNNs are chosen in preference to Recurrent Neural Networks
(RNNs) in dealing with the potential multiple aspects dis-
cussed in each review [13], [14]. Then, to address the TransE
limitations using HIN, we model a reviewer as a separate node,
rather than a connection between a product and a review.
A graph inductive learning algorithm [15] is used to fine-
tune the pre-trained embeddings from the CNNs, which are
concatenated by the respective Negative Ratio (NR) value (See
Sec. IV-D3). Negative Ratio (NR), the proportion of a user’s
negative ratio is chosen, because it has been demonstrated
as one of the most important user behavioral indicators in
previous studies [2], [3]. Other features used in [6], [7] such
as Maximum Content Similarity (MCS) and Review Length
(RL), are shown to be less significant in performance gain
despite their higher computational cost [3]. The benefit of
the graph inductive learning is twofold: first, to facilitate
the generation of embeddings for a new node, or a new
(sub)graph in real-time; and second, to refine the pre-trained
embedding. DFraud3 leverages component (review, user, and
item) features, such as text features, metadata features, and
also the graph structure (e.g., node degree), enabling the
approach to learn an embedding function that generalizes the
embedding features to unseen components. So every time a
component is added, the inductive learning propagates the
information to learn the component representation. Finally,
the representation is fed to a softmax layer for the final
classification. Softmax is chosen over SVM, due to its ability
to discriminate between samples with similar representation
and different labels; a common case in fraud review detection
with similar text for fraud and real reviews. In addition to
the substantial performance gain (15% for AUC) as compared
to the state-of-the-art, our contributions of this work can be
summarized as follows:
• We propose a novel three staged framework to address the
cold-start problem using multi-component classification.
This approach takes advantage of an HIN which consid-
ers item, review, and user as separate components. We
employ SoWE to obtain a unique representation for each
component, shown to be the first important performance
contributor. See Sec. IV-D1, IV-D2.
• For the first time, we propose a graph based inductive
learning model for fraud detection that aggregates in-
formation of a node’s neighborhood into a dense vector
embedding, addressing the limitation of TransE for multi-
relation representation. Our extensive study demonstrates
that graph based inductive learning is the second most
important performance contributor, right after the CNN
pre-trained component vectors. See Sec. IV-D3.
• We investigate the camouflage problem as pointed out but
not investigated in [2], [5], [4], [3] when it occurs together
with the cold-start problem. We devise a new approach to
evaluate the performance of the system when facing the
camouflage problem. Experimental results demonstrate
that the DFraud3 improves the detection of fraudsters who
employ camouflage, with an increase in performance of
17% as measured by AUC (see Sec. IV-D5).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II,
we present the related work. In Section III, we introduce
our methodology. In Section IV, we show the experimental
evaluation. We conclude the paper with an outlook to future
work in Section V.
3II. RELATED WORKS
A. The cold-start Problem
Despite its significance, since the first work on Fraud
Review Detection [16], only a few studies investigated the
cold-start problem. In particular, [6] employed three behavior
features, namely, Review Length (RL), Reviewer Deviation
(RD), and Maximum Content Similarity (MCS) for fraud
review detection.
To mitigate the lack of information about a new user, i.e.,
the cold-start problem, Wang et al. [6] employed TransE [8]
to encode a graph structure between an item, a user and a
review, where an item and a review are the head and the tail
of a triple respectively, and the user who wrote the review
for the item is considered as the relation. To learn vector
representations of the three components, a training objective
of TransE is to minimize the distance between an item vector
after being translated by a user vector in the embedding
space and that of the review. An item’s and a user’s vector
are randomly initialized from a random uniform distribution,
while the embedding of a review is learned through a CNN,
initialized using a pre-trained Word2Vec word embedding
(CBOW) [17]. Results on the Yelp dataset show an accuracy
of 65%.
AEDA (Attribute Enhanced Domain Adaptive) is an at-
tribute based framework proposed by You et al. [7] to adapt
the TransE model from [6]. AEDA relies on the same concepts
of that users are relations between items and reviews as in [6]
to solve the cold-start problem. Three types of relationships
are therefore defined, attribute-attribute, entity-attribute, and
entity-entity between entities (review, item, and users). Differ-
ent pairwise features (comparing two attributes of each entity)
such as date difference (dateDif), rating difference (rateDiff)
between two reviews are calculated for each entity as input
for TransE. The results of the proposed framework shows a
75.4% for accuracy on the Yelp restaurant dataset and 80.0%
on hotels, with an increase of 14% as compared with [6].
B. Network-Based Fraud Detection
As mentioned in Sec. I, HIN as one of the network based
models, has shown to be effective in network modeling [18],
[19], [20]. There are also attempts on using network based
approaches for fraud review detection, but they overlooked
the cold-start.
REV2 [21] formulates the fraudster detection as a bipartite
network between users and products, and uses a Bayesian
Inference Network (BIN) to iteratively learn the latent scor-
ing about the fairness of reviews, quality of products, and
reliability of reviewers. The performance is evaluated on 5
different datasets including Flipkart, Bitcoin OTC, Bitcoin
Alpha, Epinions, and Amazon. It uses Laplacian smoothing
to handle fraudster detection. Despite REV2 providing a
theoretical guarantee for the performance with a 64.89% for
accuracy on fraudster classification, the approach does not
perform well on the Yelp datasets. This is because in Yelp
each user has only a single or a small number of reviews,
resulting in a sparse network.
Netspam [3] modeled fraud detection as a single component
classification problem for fraud review detection. Features are
extracted from text and metadata, and a metapath is used to
model the connection between every two reviews. Reviews are
then labeled based on their similarity, through unsupervised
and semi-supervised learning. Camouflage is discussed, and
the impact of using the metapath is elaborated based on
metapath weighting concept. However, no analytic explanation
is provided to show how the framework works in face of
camouflage.
SPeagle [2], first extracts a vector of features from both text
and metadata, then applies a function on the whole vector to
calculate prior knowledge for fraudster group detection. For
classification, Loopy Belief Propagation (LBP) is used. The
results show significant performance on fraud detection on the
Yelp dataset. Similar to Netspam, SPeagle also considers the
possibility that a user might be a camouflaged fraudster. How-
ever, there is no discussion on how the framework performs
in the face of camouflage.
III. PROPOSED METHOD
In this research, we propose to model a social review plat-
form as a heterogeneous network, where each node is either
a user, an item, or a review. The connections indicate a user
has written a review for an item. Our proposed methodology
follows three main steps as illustrated in Fig. 2. First, a
vector representation for each component of the HIN including
item, review, and user are obtained. For each item and user,
reviews are aggregated and regarded as one document.The
vector representation of each (aggregated) document is fine-
tuned through a CNN. This text based representation obtained
for components is then combined with the Negative Ratio
(NR) as a behavioral feature. Next, This combination is then
fed as an input to the inductive forward propagation of the
HIN. Finally, a softmax layer is applied for a final multi-
component classification. Fig. 2 shows the overall framework
of the DFraud3.
1) Definition 1: (Multi Component Labeling) Assume a
graph G = (U, I,R,E), where there are N user nodes
U = {u1, ..., uN}, M item nodes I = {i1, ..., iM}, and P
review nodes R = {r1, ..., rP } connected through edges E.
The edge E reflects two types of relations in the network; the
edge between user and review (un, rp, type = “write”) ∈
E, and edge between review and item (rp, um, type =
“belong”) ∈ E. The goal is to label each component in
the graph. For each user, LU = {fraudster, honest}, each
item, LI = {targeted, non − targeted}, and each review,
LR = {fraud, genuine}.
A. Pre-training
In the pre-training stage, we aim to learn an initial vector
representation of each of the three components. Collective
Intelligence (CI) [11], [12] states that the intelligence about
a subject matter from a group, crowd and generally people
about a subject, when considered together is a suitable repre-
sentation of that subject matter. In the same token, we treat
the aggregation of written reviews for a specific item as a
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Fig. 2: Framework of our proposed system.
suitable descriptor for that item. When consumers consider an
item, they will look through all reviews and disregard who the
reviewers are. So a natural representation for an item would be
the collection of reviews. Similarly, the online footprint of a
person can be an important behavior or character indicator for
recruiting agencies. In other words, it makes sense to look
through reviewers’ comments collectively to gauge his/her
reviews’ behavior. Given its effectiveness and simplicity in
a multitude of semantic-centered tasks [22], [23], the SoWE
is adopted as an algorithm to obtain vector representations for
each component. In other words, the SoWE of all reviews
for an item is used as an initial vector representation for
an item; the SoWE of all reviews written by a reviewer is
used as the representation for the reviewer; and the SoWE
of the tokens in a review as the initial vector for the review.
These aggregated representations are much more meaningful
covering global characteristics of each item and user, as
compared with the random initialization, as which we will
demonstrate in our results. DFraud3 includes three main sub-
steps; word representation, sentence representation, and finally
the node representation.
1) Word Representation: For a sentence containing n
words, we denote each word as {w1, ..., wn}, where the word
i embedding is represented as ewi ∈ RD, with D as the
word vector dimension. To obtain the representation, a look-
up matrix, say E, is used, where E ∈ RD×V , with V the
vocabulary size. Here, E is initialized with a pre-trained word
embedding [24].
2) Sentence Representation: After pre-training the word
embedding, a sentence model is trained using a shared CNN
separately for each component (as shown in Fig. 2). Inspired
by [14], the CNN is trained in a supervised setting with the
ground truth data as labels, to give a primary representation of
the sentences. The convolutional layer in the CNN performs
the role of a language model. The input for this layer is the
concatenation of different words comprising the sentence, fed
to a linear layer in a fixed-length window size equal to 3,
representing a trigram language model for the words. The
concatenated word representations are denoted as I3,i ∈ RD×3
where D is the dimensionality of the word embeddings. The
output of the linear layer is:
Hi =WI3,i + b (1)
In Eq. 1, W ∈ RL×D×D3 (L as output size of linear layer),
and b are shared parameters of the layer. Next, the output of
the previous part is fed to an average pooling.
H =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Hi (2)
where n is the number of words in a sentence. Finally, a hy-
perbolic function tanh is applied to incorporate non-linearity
and obtain the final sentences’ representation as follows:
es = tanhH (3)
where es is the final embedding representation of the given
sentence s as input. The es is then, fed to a softmax layer for
classification. We use es as the output.
3) Component Representation: In this step, the input is the
embedding for each sentence, required to be concatenated for
each review, user, and item.
ec = es1 ⊕ es2 ⊕ ...⊕ esm (4)
In Eq. 4, ec is the representation of component c, and
esi∀i ∈ m indicates the representation of sentence i, and m
is the total number of sentences for c. A max pooling layer
is applied to the input to obtain the representation for each
unique component, as a node in the graph:
xc = Max-pooling(ec) (5)
In Eq. 5, xc is the final representation of component c. For
an improved representation of each component, first the NR
(Negative Ratio) for each user and item is calculated by
following equation:
NRc =
N(r = 1, 2)
N
(6)
In Eq. 6, N(r) is the number of reviews with specific ratings
(r) in range of 1-5 (5 is the highest), and N is the total
number of reviews for each component. To work out the
NR for each type of components, we count the number of
5ℎ𝑢0
0
ℎ𝑢1
0
𝑘 = 1
𝑘 = 𝐾
ℎ𝑢2
0
ℎ𝑢3
0
ℎ𝑢4
0
ℎ𝑢5
0
ℎ𝑢0
1
ℎ𝑢1
0
𝑘 = 1
𝑘 = 𝐾
ℎ𝑢2
0
ℎ𝑢3
0
ℎ𝑢4
0
ℎ𝑢5
0
Initialization: 
ℎ𝑢𝑖
0 = 𝑥𝑢𝑖 , ∀𝑢𝑖 ∈ 𝑉
𝑊𝑘 ∼ 𝑁 0,1 , ∀𝑘 ∈ {1, … , 𝐾}
First loop: 
Pick random neighbors for 𝑢0, e.g. 
𝑢1, 𝑢3, 𝑢4
ℎ𝑁(𝑢0)
1 = 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛(ℎ𝑢1
0 , ℎ𝑢3
0 , ℎ𝑢4
0 )
ℎ𝑢0
1 = 𝜎(𝑊1(ℎ𝑁 𝑢0
1 ⊕ℎ𝑢0
0 ))
… …
ℎ𝑢0
𝐾
ℎ𝑢1
𝐾−1
ℎ𝑢𝑁
0
𝑘 = 1
𝑘 = 𝐾
ℎ𝑢2
𝐾−1
ℎ𝑢3
𝐾−1
ℎ𝑢4
𝐾−1
ℎ𝑢5
𝐾−1
K’th loop: 
Pick random neighbors for 𝑢0, e.g. 
𝑢1, 𝑢2, 𝑢5
ℎ𝑁(𝑢0)
𝐾 = 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛(ℎ𝑢1
𝐾−1, ℎ𝑢2
𝐾−1, ℎ𝑢5
𝐾−1)
ℎ𝑢0
𝐾 = 𝜎(𝑊𝐾(ℎ𝑁 𝑢0
𝐾 ⊕ℎ𝑢0
𝐾−1))
…
. . . .
Back Propagation:
Update 𝑊𝑘 , ∀𝑘 ∈ {1,… , 𝐾}
regarding Eq. 8
Forward Propagation
Fig. 3: Toy example of our proposed graph learning (in this example v = u0).
low ratings (r = {1, 2}), divided by the number of total
reviews for each component. Then NR is concatenated with
the representation to obtain the final representation for each
component in network:
xv = xc ⊕NRc (7)
where xv in Eq. 7 is a pre-trained feature representation for
each component as node v in the graph.
Note that a new user is not introduced to the network unless
he/she makes a review about an item. Once the review is
written, the new user will be added to the network alongside
the review, and the review is connected to an item, and this
process continues. Items, regularly have connections in real-
world datasets, making it easy to gather data from other
reviews and users.
B. Inductive Forward Propagation
1) Objective Function: With pre-trained vectors as an input,
for obtaining final graph based embeddings, an objective func-
tion is required to guarantee the satisfaction of two criteria:
(1) neighbor nodes should have a similar representation, and
(2) distant nodes should be apart in the embedding space.
To satisfy these two criteria, we developed an unsupervised
algorithm to learn the representations. Let zu, zv be the final
vector representation of vertex u, v ∈ V , respectively, where v
is in u’s neighbourhood, The objective function below employ
Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) for training the weights:
J(zu) = − log(σ(zTu zv))−Q · Evn∼Pn(v) log(σ(−zTu zvn))
(8)
where v is a node that connects with node u in a specific
neighborhood, with a predefined search depth of K, σ is the
sigmoid function. In addition, Pn is a probability function for
negative sampling, and Q is the number of negative samples.
The first term is to ensure that two similar nodes are close
to each other in the embedding space. The second term
ensures that negative samples, i.e., nodes that are not in the
neighborhood of each other, should be distant from each other
in the embedding space.
2) Forward Propagation: We assume that the model is
trained based on the objective function in Eq. 8 and with
fixed hyper-parameters, namely K,Q,H , where K is the
specified maximum search depth, Q is the number of negative
samples, and H is number of randomly selected neighbors.
Intuitively, the reason for sampling is to reduce the compu-
tational complexity. The fixed size sampling is also to keep
the computational cost for each batch fixed. Without using
sampling, we will not be able to predict the memory used by
each batch and the runtime of batch processing, which is O(V )
in the worst case, where V is total number of nodes in the
graph. On the other hand, per-batch space and time complexity
would be fixed by the size of each batch. The testing process
is thus: when a review from a new user is added to the system,
K aggregator functions (in this case the mean aggregator)
are used to aggregate information from neighbors, with K
different weighting matrices known as W k,∀k ∈ {1, ...,K}.
The algorithm for the whole framework is described in Alg.
1.
The key idea of Alg. 1 is that through each iteration of
k, outer loop nodes’ representations are combined with the
neighbors’ representations gradually. As a result, in every
iteration of k, the node’s representation is combined with
neighbors of one more depth, where k represents the search
depth. Note that hkv denotes the node v representation at depth
k and is initialized with the pre-trained features. In other
words, for the first loop, k = 0, the representation xv is the
pre-trained features from Sec. III-A, given as an input to the
forward propagation system:
h0v = xv (9)
Each iteration in the inner loop follows three main steps; first,
the representations of a set of randomly selected neighbor
nodes, {hk−1u ,∀u ∈ N(v)} are aggregated using the “mean”
function, hkN(v), which is a single vector indicating the aggre-
gated values form the neighborhood. In every iteration, hkN(v)
6is determined by the previous neighbor nodes’ representations:
hkN(v) =
1
M
∑
u
hk−1u ,∀u ∈ N(v) (10)
where M is the number of randomly selected neighbor nodes
of node v. Neighbor nodes are selected from a uniform
distribution with probability less than 0.5. Next, this vector is
concatenated (⊕) with the node’s current representation, hk−1v
and then the resulting vector is fed to a fully connected layer
with sigmoid (σ) as its activation function.
hkv = σ
(
W k.(hk−1v ⊕ hkN(v))
)
(11)
In Eq. 11, W k is the weight matrix in the kth iteration. Finally
the representation is normalized for each node v:
hkv = h
k
v/||hkv ||2,∀v ∈ V (12)
After K steps, the generated representation hkv , is considered
as the final representation of each node, zv . These represen-
tations are then fed to a softmax layer for classifying each
node. Note that the outputs of the softmax layer are the
final classifications for each type of component, which makes
the approach capable of multi-component classification. The
forward propagation and the training process through back
propagation is depicted in Fig. 3.
Algorithm 1: Proposed Algorithm
Output: Probability of new user to be fraudster (can be
applied to review and item, as well);
Input: Review R(u, i) from new user u on item i with S
sentences and rating r;
% Pre-training;
for s← 1 to S do
{w1, w2, ..., wn} ← tokenize(s);
{ew1 , ew2 , ..., ewn} ← CBOW ({w1, w2, ..., wn});
es ← CNN({ew1 , ew2 , ..., ewn})
% New user representation;
rc ← maxPooling(concat(es,∀s ∈ R(u, i)));
xv ← rc ⊕NRc;
% Forward-Propagation;
h0v ← xv,∀v ∈ V ;
%outerloop;
for k ← 1 to K do
%innerloop;
for v ← 1 to V do
hkN(v) ← mean({hk−1u ,∀u ∈ N(v)});
hkv ← σ
(
W k.(hk−1v ⊕ hkN(v))
)
;
hkv ← hkv/||hkv ||2,∀v ∈ V %normalization;
% New user graph based representation;
zv ← hKv ,∀v ∈ V ;
% Classification;
label(v)← softmax(zv)
IV. RESULTS AND EVALUATION
A. Datasets
To address the cold-start problem we require activity history
provided through time stamps. This will help us identify new
users. Thus, for this research, we use time-stamped dataset1
Yelp. Yelp is an online platform for people to share their
experience of hotel and restaurant services in NewYork City
(NYC). Other datasets such as TripAdvisor and Amazon
lack either the ground-truth or timestamp. Hence they are
not suitable in assessing the cold-start problem. Accordingly,
similar to [6], [7] the state-of-the-art works on the cold-start,
which we use as baselines for comparison, we conduct the
experiments on the Yelp dataset. We prepared two subsets
of data from the Yelp dataset to evaluate the performance of
DFraud3. The first one is Yelp-partial with randomly selected
reviews from the whole dataset, The other is Yelp-whole which
is the whole dataset containing all the reviews. Reviews in the
datasets are labeled by the Yelp filtering system [2]. Table I
summarizes the the two datasets.
TABLE I: Basic statistics of the datasets.
Datasets Reviews (fraud%) Users Items
Yelp-partial 6,000 (17.34%) 4,046 46
Yelp-whole 608,598 (13%) 260,277 5,044
B. Experimental Setup
1) System Setting: Recent years have seen more advanced
word embedding techniques (ELMO [25], BERT [26], XLNet
[27]) developed to refresh the new state of the art techniques
on many natural language processing tasks. However, to
provide the fair comparison with the two baseline systems
(Wang et al. [6] and You et al. [7], introduced in Sec. II),
we use the same embedding techniques i.e. word embedding
initialized using 100-dimension (D) Continuous Bag of Words
(CBOW) [28] trained on Yelp dataset with a window size of
2. The vocabulary (V ) size is 37, 257 for Yelp-partial, and
5, 354, 252 for Yelp-whole. The learning rate is 0.1; batch
size was set to 256, with 10,000 training epochs. For pre-
training the CNNs, as mentioned in Sec. III-A2, the filter size
is 3, learning rate was set to 0.1, cross-entropy function is
used as an objective function, with 30 training epochs. The
initial values for W and b are set randomly from a uniform
distribution. For training the graph-based representation, the
minibatch number is 512, the learning rate was set to 0.01,
the number of training iterations was set to 30 , with 3 as
search depth (K). DFraud3 is implemented in Python using
Tensorflow 1.13.
2) Training and Test: To determine the training and test set
for evaluating DFraud3 performance on the cold-start problem,
reviews are split into two datasets with 80% of the first reviews
(based on timestamp) as the training set and remaining as the
test set. The statistics of the sets are shown in Table II.
1http://shebuti.com/collective-opinion-spam-detection/
7TABLE II: Date range of training and test set for datasets.
Datasets Start date End date
Yelp-partial Train 2005-05-10 2014-04-15Test 2014-04-15 2015-01-10
Yelp-whole Train 2004-10-20 2014-05-20Test 2014-05-20 2015-01-10
3) Labeling Procedure: Baseline systems [7], [6], provide
no information on how the labels from reviews are leveraged
to become the ground truth for users (i.e., fraudster or not).
Similarly, the near ground-truth labeling procedure of the
Yelp datasets contains labels only for reviews, not for users
(fraudster or honest), nor items (targeted or non-targeted). To
address this problem, Shebuit et al. [2] considered a user with
at least one fraud review as a fraudster. This type of labeling
can lead to inaccurate results, due to the near ground truth
labeling procedure of reviews. We used a simple probability
assignment for each user and item based on the fraud review
they write and written for, respectively. A user u(i) is a
fraudster with the probability of nfunu where nfu is the number
of fraud reviews written by user u, and nu is the total number
of reviews by the same user u. If the calculated probability is
higher than 0.5 user u is considered as a fraudster, otherwise
u is labeled as honest. Similarly, an item i is targeted with
a probability nfini , where nfi and ni are the number of fraud
reviews written for item i, and the number of total reviews
written for item i , respectively.
Since there is no ground truth on the camouflage problem,
we devised a new approach to provide the labels. We used
the camouflage definition (Sec. I) to measure the effectiveness
of DFraud3 to uncover camouflaged users. In other words,
we looked for users with both fraud and genuine reviews in
datasets and labeled them as suspicious of camouflage. For
Yelp-partial, 137 users have multiple reviews with only 2
users suspicious of camouflage. While in Yelp-whole there
are 90,179 users with multiple reviews and 2,121 users are
suspicious of camouflage. Therefore, the approach was evalu-
ated on the Yelp-whole for measuring the performance on the
camouflage task, where 905 (out of 2,121) users are considered
as camouflaged users for the test set (from original training and
test set in Table II) and remaining (1215 users) are considered
as training.
C. Evaluation Metrics
For evaluation, we rank the fraudster probability for each
user. Users with higher values are more probable to be a
fraudster. We used three standard metrics to describe the
performance: Area Under Curve (AUC), Average Precision
(AP ), and F-measure.
1) Area Under Curve: For AUC [2], integration of the area
under the plot of True Positive Ratio (TPR) on the x-axis
and False Positive Ratio (FPR) on the y-axis is calculated.
Consider A as a list of sorted users in descending order
according to their probability to be a fraudster. If we consider
nj is the number of fraudster (honest) users sorted before the
user in index j, then TPR (FPR) for index j is njf , where
f is the total number of fraudster (honest) users. The AUC
is calculated as follows:
AUC =
N∑
i=2
(FPR(i)− FPR(i− 1)) ∗ (TPR(i)) (13)
where N is the total number of reviews.
2) Average Precision: For AP [3], [2], we need to have a
list of sorted users based on their probability to be a fraudster.
If I is a list of sorted user indices based on their probability
and M is the total number of fraudster users, then AP is
formalized by:
AP =
M∑
i=1
i
I(i)
(14)
3) F-measure: Also known as F1 [6], uses two main strate-
gies for measuring performance, Micro and Macro. The former
uses all correct estimations for different classes and then
calculates the measure, regarding collected estimations, while
the latter calculates the measure for each class separately, and
then average the values. Obviously, with imbalanced data,
using micro measure seems legit, while for balanced data
macro measure can also be useful. F1 is calculated as follows:
F1 =
2 ∗ precision ∗ recall
precision+ recall
(15)
D. Main Results
1) Ablative Study: To investigate the effectiveness of our
graph based inductive learning, we used different combination
of graph based approaches with different classifiers:
Pre-trained + TransE + SVM (the effectiveness of pre-
trained features): This set is similar to study on [6] and [7],
and only differs in the pre-trained features (see Sec. III-A).
Here, Word Embeddings (WE) and Negative Ratio (NR) are
used as pre-trained features.
Pre-trained + Inductive + SVM (the effectiveness of
inductive learning): To show the effectiveness of DFraud3,
the TransE model is replaced by our proposed inductive
learning approach in Sec. III-B2.
Pre-trained + Inductive + softmax (the effectiveness of
softmax): To observe the effectiveness of using the softmax
as the classifier, the SVM is replaced with a softmax classifier.
Table III shows DFraud3 outperforms the two baseline
systems on Yelp-partial. The results suggest that inductive
learning yields better performance for all metrics. DFraud3
performs better in terms of F1-Micro, while the results for F1-
Macro is less encouraging, we attribute this to the unbalanced
distribution of different classes over the partial dataset. The
AP and AUC for DFraud3 also demonstrate better results
in comparison with baseline frameworks. Surprisingly, the
performance of our approach is significantly improved using
the softmax as the classifier for AP . One reason could be
because the SVM works better for samples close to the
margins. When the margin criteria is satisfied for the SVM, it
will output the results. In better words, the SVM fails to model
the samples with high feature similarity and different labels.
As a result, the SVM works better for distant samples. The
objective of the SVM is to maximize the margin which means
for metrics like AP , the SVM works better since anomalies
8will not affect the classifier. On the contrary, the softmax
objective is to produce a high probability for the correct class
and small changes in samples can have a large effect on its
performance. This can result in a noticeable difference in AP .
By replacing the pre-trained features employed in [7] and
[6] and keeping the TransE model and SVM classifier, we
observe that the performance is improved for all metrics. This
indicates that our proposed pre-trained features are effective
in capturing the feature of the three components of a re-
view platform. Substituting the TransE model with inductive
learning results in a further improvement for all metrics, as
compared with the two baseline systems, but a drop in F1-
Macro as compared to TransE model. The classifier adjustment
to softmax brings improvement for most metrics, apart from
AP .
The results for the Yelp-whole dataset are displayed in Table
III. Obviously, the performance improves using all the data
from the training set. In addition, the results on the Yelp-
whole dataset show that DFraud3 outperforms the two previous
baseline systems for all four metrics. Similar to Yelp-partial,
the performance is boosted for AP . In addition, except for
F1-Macro inductive learning outperforms the TransE model.
One can explain the reason for the reduction of F1-Macro
by justifying the data imbalance. As it is shown in Table
IV-A, 17% of of reviews in Yelp-partial and 13% of reviews
in Yelp-whole are labeled as fraud reviews. This indicates a
considerable imbalance between the number of fraud reviews
and genuine ones.
2) Multi-Component Classification Analysis: DFraud3 per-
forms classification on all of the three components. Fig. 4,
5 depict the effectiveness of DFraud3 for multi-component
classification. Results demonstrate that our system yields better
performance on fraudster/honest user classification as com-
pared with the classification of reviews and items. Considering
the probability for each node as ground-truth (explained in Sec.
IV-B3), instead of using binary labeling, it assists the model
to detect the fraudsters with high performance in comparison
with other types of components. In addition, the perfor-
mance improves with more data as training data increases.
Observation on datasets suggests that performance on three
components reaches stability on Yelp-whole compared to Yelp-
partial. This indicates that with complete data the performance
is improved for users, items, and reviews.
3) Impact of Inductive Learning: Another key difference
between DFraud3 and baseline systems is the use of the
forward propagation after the pre-training step which outputs a
refined primary representation of each component. To observe
the forward propagation’s impact on the performance of the
approach, we devised four different feature combinations:
Rand + Inductive: A random feature representation is
generated and then fed to the inductive learning for the final
representation. The final representation is then fed to the
softmax layer for final classification.
WE (Word Embedding) + Inductive: The pre-trained rep-
resentation for this category is based on the word embeddings
(WE) only excluding the NR. This representation is then fed
to the inductive learning for final representation. The final
F1-Micro F1-Macro AP AUC
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0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
User Review Item
Fig. 4: Comparison of DFraud3 performance on different
components for Yelp-partial (dark blue = user, light blue =
review, gray = item).
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Fig. 5: Comparison of DFraud3 performance on different
components for Yelp-whole (dark blue = user, light blue =
review, gray = item).
labeling is based on the softmax classification.
WE + NR: Inductive learning is withdrawn for this part
and the pre-trained features are directly fed to softmax layer
for final classification.
WE + NR + Inductive: This represents the whole system.
Fig. 6, 7 represent the impact of inductive learning on both
datasets regarding the mentioned metrics. There is a noticeable
difference between the accuracy of the approach with and
without the inductive learning (blue vs. green). Results demon-
strate that the incremental aggregation of information from
neighbors is effective at improving the system for addressing
the cold-start problem (inductively based features outperform
pre-trained features; yellow vs. blue). In addition, the perfor-
mance of DFraud3 on pre-trained features alone without graph
embedding is already on par with baseline systems. In other
words, even without applying inductive learning, DFraud3
performs as well as previous studies. Furthermore, adding the
NR feature improves the system performance which confirms
previous works’ findings [2], [3] regarding the importance
9TABLE III: Performance of DFraud3 on cold-start user classification in comparison with [6] and [7] on both datasets.
Framework Yelp-partial Yelp-wholeF1-Micro F1-Macro AP AUC F1-Micro F1-Macro AP AUC
Wang et al. 0.6031 0.5321 0.3232 0.5805 0.675 0.622 0.2691 0.5838
You et al. 0.6858 0.6021 0.3546 0.6353 0.7153 0.6431 0.3018 0.6283
pre-trained + TransE + SVM 0.7035 0.6476 0.3696 0.6527 0.7602 0.6592 0.3348 0.6549
pre-trained + inductive + SVM 0.7407 0.6255 0.4432 0.6600 0.8372 0.5913 0.4372 0.6913
DFraud3 0.7750 0.6666 0.3642 0.7009 0.8385 0.7087 0.3734 0.7331
F1-Micro F1-Macro AP AUC
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Rand+ Inductive
WE + Inductive
WE + NR
WE + NR + Inductive
Fig. 6: Impact of inductive learning on cold-start user clas-
sification on Yelp-partial (purple = Rand + Inductive, blue =
WE + Inductive, green = WE + NR, yellow = WE + NR +
Inductive).
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Fig. 7: Impact of inductive learning on cold-start user clas-
sification on Yelp-whole (purple = Rand + Inductive, blue =
WE + Inductive, green = WE + NR, yellow = WE + NR +
Inductive).
of NR (yellow vs. blue). The only exception for the NR
role in improving the performance is AUC for the Yelp-
partial dataset, which is due to a lack of information about
all components in Yelp-partial. For F1-Micro, there is a small
difference between inductive and NR (green vs. blue) which
shows how much NR is effective in improving the performance
of the approach. It is worth mentioning that with a bigger
dataset the pre-trained features perform better than the small
F1-Micro F1-M acro AP AUC
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
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0.9
Whole data
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1-N-1 relations excluded
Fig. 8: Impact of N-1, and 1-N-1 relations on cold-start user
classification on Yelp-whole (purple = Whole data, green =
N-1 relations excluded, yellow = 1-N-1 relations excluded).
dataset (yellow vs. blue).
4) Impact of N-1 Modelling: As mentioned in Sec. I,
DFraud3 handles the N-1 and 1-N-1 relations, which was
the limitation of the TransE model. To demonstrate that our
performance gain is due to the better handling of N-1, and 1-
N-1 relations, an experiment is conducted. In this experiment
the N-1 relation, i.e., the same reviews written by the same
users on different items; and 1-N-1, i.e. the same reviews
written by different users, on the same item (TransE ends up
with the same representations for different users in this case)
are removed. Fig. 8 represents the impact of N-1, and 1-N-1
relations removal on the performance.
As Fig. 8 shows, the removal of the same reviews by
the same users on different items drops the performance
for all measures. Intuitively, DFraud3 makes use of user
representation and its neighbors to calculate the final repre-
sentation. More importantly, removing the relations with the
same reviews on the same items with different users leads
to a noticeable reduction performance as compared with the
baseline systems. This, in turn, strengthened our claims that
the performance gain of our system is due to its effectiveness
in handling cold-start. As a result of 1-N-1 removal, the system
efficiency in handling cold-start is reduced, dramatically.
5) Dealing with Camouflage: As mentioned in Sec. I,
genuine reviews are not always written by honest people, and
they can be written by fraudsters to hide their true identity.
Previous approaches have not considered this problem since
a fraudster can easily manipulate the traces by writing some
honest reviews. We address this issue by using propagation
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over nodes. Then, the representation of each node is combined
with its neighbors to regulate its importance in covering
fraudsters.
The performance on the two baseline systems is compared
with DFraud3. The results are presented in Table IV.
TABLE IV: Performance comparison on camouflaged users
(1215 users as training set and 905 users as test set) in Yelp-
whole
Framework F1-Micro F1-Macro AP AUC
Wang et al. 0.6212 0.6319 0.2801 0.5939
You et al. 0.6592 0.6602 0.2991 0.6082
DFraud3 0.7846 0.6969 0.3940 0.7720
Table IV presents the performance of the approach to cam-
ouflage detection against two baseline systems. We observe
that our system outperforms the two baseline systems across
all measures. Analysis suggests that using graph-based forward
propagation helps the system to learn feature representations
from neighbor nodes, which helps uncover the true intentions
of users for writing contradicting reviews in terms of authen-
ticity. Similar to Sec. IV-D4, we conducted an experiment to
demonstrate that the gain in the performance is also due to the
better handling the camouflage users. Fig. 9 shows the perfor-
mance of DFraud3 for two cases: when camouflaged users
are included, and when they are excluded from the dataset.
As we can see, the performance drops after excluding the
camouflaged users. Analytically, camouflaged users first write
genuine reviews to hide their true intentions, in the worst-case
scenario. This means that the fraud detection system requires
information from both the neighbors and the node itself.
Previous approaches employed information only from one-hop
neighbors, which is not helpful in cases of camouflage. Also,
they missed the opportunity of using the initial information for
each user, which can be used to initialize the pre-knowledge of
each node. To address the first problem, graph-based inductive
learning facilitates information propagation for more than one
hop and it helps to gather information from distant nodes
rather than just the neighbor nodes. The second limitation is
addressed using the pre-training step (Sec. III-A). This leads
to the effective detection of camouflaged users.
V. CONCLUSION
Cold-start is a challenging issue that hinders the effective
detection of fraudsters in social review platforms. In this
research, we devised a system that takes advantage of the
textual and rating data (abundant surface data) and aggregates
them through a CNN as initially learned features for a vector
representation of each component of a social review platform.
The initial vector representation is then refined through a
graph inductive learning algorithm we proposed to capture the
interplay between a user, an item and a review, using multi-
component classification (reviews to fraud, genuine; user to
fraudster, honest; and items to targeted, non-targeted) as the
downstream task. Two sets of comprehensive ablative studies
have been carried out that demonstrate the effectiveness of
our approach to learning the representation of each component.
Notably, there is significant performance gain achieved by WE
F1-Micro F1-Macro AP AUC
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Fig. 9: Impact of considering camouflaged users on DFraud3
performance on Yelp-whole (purple = camouflaged users in-
cluded, yellow = camouflaged users excluded).
+ NR and performing inductive learning on the Yelp dataset
from two domains; restaurants and hotels. Defining a new
relationship between components, from a different view can
be seen as future work. One way is to consider each link’s
importance regarding metapath weight [3] to calculate contri-
butions of the influence of each link in the final classification.
This also can be applied to contents from other media such as
twitter to assist spam detection [29], [30], [31].
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